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LAW REFORM ONLINE
COMMENT

ONE MORE GOOD REASON FOR IN-CAR VIDEOTAPING OF
TRAFFIC STOPS: AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF
“CONSENT”
Robert L. White*
There are a number of reasons why legislative reform
mandating the use of in-car cameras in police cruisers would
benefit the criminal justice system in Illinois. In-car cameras
provide evidence for cases involving traffic violations or
intoxicated motorists. 1 They produce instantly available training
materials. 2 They also assist victims of police misconduct, 3 as well
as officers defending themselves against misconduct claims. 4 This
Comment looks to add to this list of benefits the role in-car
cameras can play in assessing the validity of consents to search
that officers obtain during traffic stops.
I. THE VALIDITY OF CONSENT OFTEN HINGES ON POLICE-CITIZEN
INTERCHANGES IN QUICKLY DEVELOPING CIRCUMSTANCES
In the Supreme Court’s guiding case on consent
searches, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,5 the Court stated that
consent searches “normally occur … under informal and
unstructured conditions” and highlighted that requests for
consent to search may be the product of quickly developing

*
J.D. Candidate, May 2014, University of Michigan Law School.
1.
See Thomas A. Kantas, Missing Video Evidence in DUI Cases After People v.
Kladis, 100 ILL. B.J. 250, 250 (2012).
2.
See Matthew D. Thurlow, Lights, Camera, Action: Video Cameras As Tools of
Justice, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 771, 810 (2005).
3.
See Sarah Schulte, Beating Video Played in Streamwood Police Trial, (ABC 7 News
television broadcast Mar. 9, 2011), available at http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/story?section=ne
ws/local&id=8004053.
4.
See Thurlow, supra note 2, at 809; see generally, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–
81 (2007) (relying on in-car camera footage in concluding officer did not violate Fourth
Amendment during high-speed pursuit).
5.
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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circumstances. 6 My eleven years of experience as a police officer
in
Illinois
convince
me
of
the
accuracy
of
aforementioned
generalizations.
the Schneckloth majority’s
However, I believe that the language of Justice Marshall’s dissent
best characterizes how the validity of consent should be judged.
Justice Marshall stated that the validity of consent should turn “on
a realistic assessment of the nature of the interchange between
citizens and the police.” 7 Marshall went on to criticize the
majority’s “perception of these interchanges and their accordance
with reality.” 8 A requirement of in-car cameras in police cruisers
would produce evidence that most accurately depicts the “nature
of the interchange between citizens and police”—evidence that
would be used by courts when analyzing the validity of consent
searches obtained during traffic stops.
II. WHY THE IN-CAR CAMERA CAN ADDRESS THE VALIDITY OF
CONSENT
Traffic stops are certainly “informal and unstructured
conditions” with “quickly developing circumstances.” Since 2007,
Illinois has collected data on consent searches conducted
subsequent to a traffic stop, including whether a consent search
was requested and whether the motorist granted or denied the
request. 9 Using my former employer’s entries as an example, the
collected data shows that from 2007–2011 officers from the
municipality I patrolled requested consent to search vehicles 596
times. 10 Consent was granted for 593 of these requests. 11
I observed many consent searches conducted along the
boundary lines of the Fourth Amendment, where a decision on
the validity of the search depended on an individual judge’s
interpretation of police or citizen conduct as verbally
communicated through testimony or as documented in a police
report. Many of the grants of “consent” to search that I witnessed
were simply citizen acquiescence to officers’ persuasive techniques

6.
Id. at 232.
7.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8.
Id.
9.
See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11–212 (2012).
10. ILL. DEPT. OF TRANSP. http://www.dot.state.il.us/trafficstop/meeting.html (click on
“Study Links” for 2007–2011 on far right of page, then click on “Illinois Traffic Stop Report”
and scroll down to “Carol Stream Police”).
11. Id.
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and/or subtle leveraging. However, a number of tactics that were
either coercive (or nearly so) rarely found their way into written
police reports.
Tone, body language, and the use of forceful words on the part
of the investigating officer are all factors that may be absent from
an officer’s report or testimony but would be captured by in-car
video. 12 Accurate portrayal of these factors in court is even more
important in light of court decisions that do not require police
officers to advise suspects of their right to refuse consent 13 and
allow police officers to infer consent from nonverbal conduct. 14
III. THE IN-CAR CAMERA SHOULD BE A PREFERRED SOLUTION
One way to address the problem of coercive consent searches
is to require officers to obtain written documentation of
consent. 15 Such a mandate could be placed on officers by statute,
judicial decision, or even a police department policy. However,
this may do little more than memorialize the outcome of the
police-motorist interchange without addressing the potentially
coercive means by which it is reached. 16 This solution also does
little to protect against post-hoc documentation of probable cause
or reasonable suspicion that the officer may or may not have
otherwise noted before requesting consent to search.

12. See People v. Leach, 959 N.E.2d 680, 685 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), appeal denied, 962
N.E.2d 486 (Ill. 2011) (identifying several issues that could be resolved with video
evidence); People v. Ramsey, 839 N.E.2d 1093, 1100 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
13. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 (1973) (identifying suspect’s
knowledge of their right to refuse as a factor, but not dispositive, in determining the
validity of consent).
14. See, e.g., People v. Anthony, 761 N.E.2d 1188, 1192–93 (Ill. 2001); In re M.N., 645
N.E.2d 499, 502–03 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
15. See Joint Application for Entry of Consent Decree, United States v. New Jersey,
No. 99–5970(MLC) (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1999), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/jointapp.htm.h
tm (requiring written consent for consent searches on traffic stops); see also Schneckloth,
412 U.S. at 229–30 (“There might be rare cases where it could be proved from the record
that a person in fact affirmatively knew of his right to refuse—such as a case where he
announced to the police that if he didn’t sign the consent form, ‘you (police) are going to
get a search warrant.’”).
16. See People v. Cardenas, 604 N.E.2d 953, 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (concluding
voluntary consent absent when defendant signed consent form after being given
misleading information by the police); People v. Purchase, 573 N.E.2d 831, 883 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991) (stating that a written waiver of consent is not dispositive when obtained by coercion).
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In-car videotaping of traffic stops is one way to protect against
illegally-administered consent searches without abolishing
consent searches altogether. The use of videotaped evidence could
potentially eliminate much of the “swearing contest” aspect of
consent search suppression hearings. 17 This is not a novel
approach, as Illinois already effectively mandates the use of video
recording for certain custodial interrogations.18 Applying a similar
measure to consent searches during traffic stops would place the
judge in the defendant-motorist’s position, assisting the judge in
reaching a more objective decision regarding a reasonable
person’s response to the officer’s tone, demeanor, and nonverbal
communication.
In addition to helping the judge address issues of subtle
coercion, the in-car video also places a concrete value on many of
the variables involved in the totality of the circumstances calculus
used to decide the validity of consent. 19 Video evidence would help
settle many disputes over the number of officers present, the
display of any weapons, and whether the suspect’s inquiries were
answered directly and honestly. Video evidence also preserves the
officer’s phrasing of the request to search and the defendant’s
phrasing of any express waiver, thereby eliminating errors in
recollection. In practice, in-car videos should also lead to a
decreased necessity for actual suppression hearings following
review by a prosecutor or criminal defense attorney. 20
IV. CONCLUSION
As previously stated, in-car videotaping of traffic stops has
many benefits for criminal defendants, innocent suspects, and

17. See Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211,
246–47 (2002); see also Purchase, 573 N.E.2d at 833 (“This case presents a simple issue of
whether the defendant’s or the State’s witnesses were more credible.”).
18. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103–2.1(b) (2012) (establishing a presumption of
inadmissibility for custodial interrogations that are not electronically recorded).
19. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1996); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233.
20. See Andrew E. Taslitz, High Expectations and Some Wounded Hopes: The Policy
and Politics of A Uniform Statute on Videotaping Custodial Interrogations , 7 NW. J.
L. & SOC. POL’Y 400, 406 (2012) (arguing that police recordings aid in “systemic efficiency”
by reducing the number of frivolous suppression motions); see also Thomas P.
Sullivan, Three Police Station Reforms to Prevent Convicting the Innocent, CBA REC., Apr.
2003, at 30, 32 (stating that arguments about excessive equipment costs associated with
videotaping custodial interrogations can be addressed by comparing such costs to the costs
of time-consuming suppression hearings and false allegations of police misconduct).
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police officers alike. A more comprehensive assessment of the
validity of consent is one more reason why Illinois should
mandate the installation of in-car cameras in police cruisers. Such
a reform could afford police officers the benefits of continuing to
use the consent search as an investigatory tool while still
protecting criminal defendants through preservation of the
unique nature of each police-citizen “interchange” for Justice
Marshall’s “realistic assessment” of the validity of the consent
granted.

